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Abstract
Deep neural networks, although shown to be a successful
class of machine learning algorithms, are known to be ex-
tremely unstable to adversarial perturbations. Improving the
robustness of neural networks against these attacks is impor-
tant, especially for security-critical applications. To defend
against such attacks, we propose dividing the input image
into multiple patches, denoising each patch independently,
and reconstructing the image, without losing significant im-
age content. We call our method D3. This proposed defense
mechanism is non-differentiable which makes it non-trivial
for an adversary to apply gradient-based attacks. Moreover,
we do not fine-tune the network with adversarial examples,
making it more robust against unknown attacks. We present
an analysis of the tradeoff between accuracy and robustness
against adversarial attacks. We evaluate our method under
black-box, grey-box, and white-box settings. On the Ima-
geNet dataset, our method outperforms the state-of-the-art
by 19.7% under grey-box setting, and performs comparably
under black-box setting. For the white-box setting, the pro-
posed method achieves 34.4% accuracy compared to the 0%
reported in the recent works.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have produced valuable
results on many practical applications [28, 12, 51, 2, 26],
but are vulnerable to even small adversarial perturba-
tions [18, 39, 7]. In particular, such perturbations can change
the decision of DNN-based image classifiers. The vulnera-
bility of deep networks to adversarial manipulations of their
input goes beyond classification tasks and additive perturba-
tions [11, 34, 10, 25]. Moreover, the attacks are transferrable,
meaning that an adversary can find these perturbations with-
out having access to the network. For example, [29, 1]
successfully attacked image classifiers used in commercial
applications. These observations highlight the need to im-
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Figure 1: The proposed method (D3) transforms the input
image using a non-differentiable algorithm. This transfor-
mation removes adversarial noise to improve robustness to
attacks.
prove the robustness of deep networks, especially, if they are
deployed in a hostile or security-critical environment.
Many existing defense methods either show results on
small datasets, such as MNIST or CIFAR-10 [30, 6, 42],
or they add adversarial examples to the training data [47].
Since new attacks are constantly being proposed, the defense
should be attack-agnostic to make it robust against an un-
known attack. An ideal defense should be non-differentiable
so it does not allow the adversary to back-propagate through
the defense mechanism.
Our defense mechanism (Figure 1) maps an input image
to a new space and is based on the following observations:
(1) increased dimensionality has an adverse effect on the
robustness of deep networks [15], (2) the mapping should
not reduce the accuracy of clean data, and (3) the mapping
should be stable such that the output is minimally sensitive
to input perturbations.
Our method divides the input image into multiple over-
lapping patches that are projected to a lower dimensional
space using a dictionary. The dictionary consists of clean
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image patches to reconstruct the input image patches with
a variant of the matching pursuit (MP) algorithm [32]. We
use this algorithm for denoising because it is fast and non-
differentiable. We propose a novel patch-selection algorithm
to construct the dictionary such that the selected patches
are not too similar and they represent the salient parts of
the image. This selection process mitigates the effect of
adversarial perturbations while maintaining good accuracy
on clean images.
We evaluate our algorithm using the ImageNet dataset
under three settings – (1) black-box attacks where the ad-
versary does not know about the network or the defense
method, (2) grey-box attacks where the adversary knows the
network parameters but not about the defense mechanism,
and (3) white-box attacks where the adversary knows both
the network parameters and the defense algorithm. Our algo-
rithm performs comparably to other state-of-the-art methods
on the black-box setting and performs significantly better
on grey-box and white-box attacks. In addition, we show
that as task complexity decreases (e.g. with a subset of the
ImageNet classes), we can remove more information con-
tent from the image by denoising while maintaining high
accuracy and robustness. Our contributions are:
• We propose a novel framework for defending against
adversarial attacks by dividing images into overlap-
ping patches and denoising them independently using
a non-differentiable, attack-agnostic algorithm. Our
patch-based method is particularly designed for high-
dimensional datasets, e.g. ImageNet.
• We provide a thorough analysis of the tradeoff between
clean image accuracy and robustness against adversarial
attacks.
• We extensively evaluate our method on the ImageNet
and CIFAR-10 datasets under different adversarial set-
tings. We compare with the state-of-the-art papers and
the NIPS-2017 challenge, and show improved perfor-
mance.
2. Related Work
The seminal work by [46] highlights the vulnerability of
deep neural networks to adversarial examples. Since then,
many methods have been proposed to assess such vulnera-
bility by developing various adversarial attacks. In [18], the
authors proposed Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) which
attacks a classifier by computing the sign of the gradient of
the loss w.r.t. the input images. To assess the robustness of
deep networks more accurately, iterative algorithms such as
DeepFool [37] and C&W [9] have later been introduced.
It is also possible to use generative models like Generative
Adversarial Networks (GANs) [17] to generate adversarial
perturbations [5, 21].
In [46], it has also been shown that adversarial attacks are
transferrable and can be used in black-box settings. In these
settings, the adversary has access neither to the weights
of the network nor to the architecture. More recently, it
has been shown that there exists image-agnostic attacks,
universal adversarial perturbation [36], which can be added
to any image to fool a given network. Even worse, these
perturbations can be computed without the dataset used for
training the network [38].
In recent years, there have been several efforts to defend
against adversarial attacks. The first defense against adver-
sarial perturbations was proposed by [19] where they use
stacked denoising auto-encoders to mitigate perturbations. A
similar approach has been studied in [33] to denoise adversar-
ial examples. Recently, other generative models, e.g. GANs
and PixelCNN [48], have been used to project back the ma-
licious samples on the manifold of data [42, 45]. However,
such methods are restricted to small-scale datasets such as
MNIST and CIFAR-10. In [40], distillation was suggested as
a defense; however, it only masks the gradient and is still vul-
nerable in black-box settings as demonstrated in [9]. In [30],
authors provide an efficient adversarial training framework
based on the robust optimisation to counter the first-order ad-
versaries. However, their method is not model-agnostic and
due to computational complexities, it has not been applied
on large-scale datasets such as ImageNet. Recently, in [47],
adversarial training has been applied on ImageNet using an
ensemble of networks. The main drawback of such adver-
sarial training scheme is that it overfits the noise and does
not generalize well against an unknown attack [20]. Very
recently, several strategies to defend against attacks have
been explored using various image transformations [20]. As
a different approach, detecting malicious samples, instead of
improving the robustness, is sought in [35, 16]. They demon-
strated that deep networks can be augmented with a network
to detect adversarial examples. This approach also suffers
from overfitting to specific types of perturbations. Recent
work, [8], has successfully attacked ten different defense
strategies emphasizing the difficulty of this problem.
There have been few theoretical works studying the ro-
bustness of deep networks. There is a tradeoff between
accuracy and robustness of kernel classifiers [14]. In [15],
the authors established a bound on the robustness of a certain
type of classifiers when the adversary is restricted to a low
dimensional space. In [44, 23], some lower bounds have
been derived on the robustness of simple neural networks.
3. Problem Formulation
Let fθ(x) : Rd → N be a classifier parameterized by
θ that computes the class of an input image x, where N
is the set of natural numbers denoting class labels. An
adversary can perturb the image with noise v such that
fθ(x) 6= fθ(x + v). The robustness of the classifier at
Figure 2: Reducing dimensionality improves the robustness
of the classifier. P is a union of subspaces illustrated by the
blue hyper-planes. Here, x˜ = T (x) is the image projected
to the nearest subspace in P . To avoid clutter, we are not
showing the original image x. The adversarial noise v∗
is the smallest distance from x˜ to the classifier’s decision
surface B. When the adversary is restricted to a smaller
dimensional subspace (the projected hyper-plane), the norm
of the noise vP is much bigger than the norm of v∗ to cross
the decision boundary.
Figure 3: Overview of the proposed D3 algorithm. An input
image is divided into patches and each patch is denoised
independently.
x0, denoted by ρ(x0), can be defined as the minimum per-
turbation needed to change the predicted label [15]:
ρ(x0) = argmin
v
‖v‖2, s. t. fθ(x) 6= fθ(x+ v). (1)
The noise can be scaled to make the attack stronger. We
improve robustnesss by learning a stable transformation,
T (.), such that the label of the transformed image does not
change when corrupted with the noise, i.e. fθ(T (x)) =
fθ(T (x+ v)). Moreover, we want to maintain the accuracy
when the clean images are transformed by T (.) ensuring that
the fθ(T (x)) is equal to the ground truth label of x. Most
attacks rely on computing gradients of the classification
function w.r.t. the input. Hence, it is desirable to make the
transformation T (.) non-differentiable so that the gradients
cannot pass through the defense block. To create a defense
mechanism that is robust against an unknown future attack,
we want to keep the defense algorithm to be attack-agnostic
and do not want to fine-tune the network with simulated
adversarial images.
Under some regularity conditions, restricting the adver-
sary to a low dimensional subspace can improve robust-
ness [15]. Simple dimensionality reduction methods, such
as PCA, have been studied in [6, 24] to improve defense
against adversarial perturbations. However, such solutions
only work on simpler tasks (such as classification on MNIST
digits) as they significantly decrease the discriminative per-
formance of the network. Such transformations usually
remove the high frequency information required for com-
plex tasks such as 1000-class classification on ImageNet
dataset [12]. Therefore, a better information preserving di-
mensionality reduction method is required to limit the space
of adversarial noise, while keeping important details.
4. The D3 Algorithm
Assume that an operator T (x) projects the input image
x ∈ Rd to the closest subspace in a union of m dimensional
subspaces. This operation is a linear projection operator
onto an m dimensional subspace in a local neighborhood
of x. For additive perturbations, the adversary is limited
to locally seeking noise in an m dimensional subspace and
the robustness, ρ, can ideally be improved by a factor of√
d/m [15]. This intuition is illustrated in Figure 2. Mo-
tivated by this result, we look for a transformation, T (.),
satisfying the following conditions: (1) rank JT (x)  d,
where x ∈ Rd, where JT (x) is the Jacobian matrix in a
small neighborhood of x, and (2) ‖T (x)− x‖ is small. The
first condition ensures that the local dimensionality is low,
and the second condition means that the image and its trans-
formed version are close enough to each other to preserve
visual information.
We propose a patch-based denoising method for defense.
We divide the input image into multiple patches, and denoise
them independently with sparse reconstruction using a dic-
tionary of patches. Assume that κ is the sparsity (number
of components used to reconstruct a patch) and each patch
is P × P pixels. Then, for non-overlapping patches, the
local dimensionality of our projection operator T (.) would
be κ dP 2 . According to [15], this dimensionality reduction
would ideally improve robustness by a factor of P√
κ
.
Sparse reconstruction and dictionary-based methods have
been widely used to enhance the quality of images [3, 31, 13,
49, 43, 41]. For computational efficiency, we use sampled
image patches as our dictionary. We use a novel patch se-
lection algorithm that is optimized to improve robustness of
the classifier. For sparse reconstruction, we use an efficient
greedy algorithm which is a variant of matching pursuit [32]
. Our method is summarized in Figure 3.
Computing the performance of the D3 algorithm for dif-
ferent hyper-parameters requires both training the D3 algo-
rithm and the classification network, which are computation-
ally expensive. Therefore, to efficiently study the effect of
hyper-parameters of our algorithm, we compute the follow-
ing proxy metrics:
(1) “Matching-rate” (MR) is the fraction of patches that
are identical in the denoised image T (x+ v) and the clean
image T (x). Let {p1,p2, . . . ,pn} and {pˆ1, pˆ2, . . . , pˆn}
be patches extracted from x and x + v, respectively. The
matching-rate is defined as, MR = Ex∈D(γ(x)), where
γ(x) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
1‖T(pj)−T(pˆj)‖∞≤δ
and 1[.] is an indicator function. Here, with slight abuse of
notation, we assume that T (.) is applied to patches. Higher
MR corresponds to being more robust to the attacks.
(2)“Reconstruction-error” (RE) is the average `2 distance
between the clean image, x, and the transformed im-
age, T (x): RE = Ex∈D(‖x − T (x)‖2/‖x‖2). A higher
reconstruction-quality, (1− RE), results in higher classifica-
tion accuracy for the clean images as more information is
retained.
Our experiments show that these proxy metrics are highly
correlated with accuracy and robustness of the classifier. We
use 500 images randomly chosen from the dataset to quickly
compute these values. Next, we describe the patch denoising
algorithm (D3-MP), and the patch-selection algorithm to
construct the dictionaries (D3-DL).
4.1. Patch-based Denoising (D3-MP)
Let {Si}κi=1 be a set of dictionaries computed using our
patch-selection algorithm. Each dictionary Si ∈ RP 2×η
is a matrix containing η columns of dimension P 2. Here,
κ is the sparsity. The first dictionary S1 is used to select
the first atom, while reconstructing a given patch p. Then,
the residual is computed between the image patch, p, and
the selected atom, sl. As in the standard matching pursuit
(MP), the residual is used to select the next atom. But unlike
standard MP, we use a different dictionary, Si, to select
at the ith sparsity level. We provide pseudo-code for this
approach in Algorithm 1.
4.2. Patch Selection Algorithm to Learn Dictionar-
ies (D3-DL)
To scale up the dictionary learning task for a large dataset
such as the ImageNet, we propose an efficient greedy patch-
selection algorithm. As mentioned earlier, we compute mul-
tiple dictionaries for different sparsity levels in our D3-MP
algorithm.
We build the set of dictionaries in a greedy manner by
selecting the “important” and “diverse” patches. The algo-
rithm takes into account the saliency information of images.
The norm of the gradient of the classification function w.r.t.
to the input image is used as the saliency map. We do im-
portance sampling among all the patches w.r.t. the saliency
map. We add a patch to the dictionary if the reconstruction
of the patch using the existing dictionary has greater than a
threshold angular distance, , from the patch. The saliency
map helps to preserve the details that are important for the
classification task, and the cutoff on the angular distance
ensures that the dictionary is diverse.
In our experiments, using a pre-tained network on the
ImageNet dataset, we find 4% improvement in classification
accuracy with the saliency map compared to randomly se-
lecting a patch from the whole image. The diversity among
dictionary atoms encourages mapping a clean and corre-
sponding noisy image patch to the same dictionary atom.
Ensuring that any two patches from the dictionary are a cer-
tain threshold apart also improves the MR and the robustness
of the classifier.
After the first dictionary is constructed, we reconstruct
the image patches using this dictionary and compute the
residuals. The next dictionary is constructed on the residual
images instead of the original images. This process is re-
peated for all the remaining dictionaries (see Algorithm 2 for
pseudo-code). We found that the MR and 1 - RE were higher
when we used a different dictionary for different sparsity
levels using residual images compared to using one common
dictionary for all sparsity levels constructed from original
images. For example, with κ = 2, we found the MR = 0.88,
1 - RE = 0.83 when using two separate dictionaries where
the second dictionary contained residuals instead of image
patches. Comparing those to MR = 0.80, 1 - RE = 0.81
when using one dictionary, constructed using original image
patches, shows that using multiple dictionaries gives better
matching-rate and reconstruction quality.
4.3. Denoising Algorithm
The proposed defense algorithm (D3): (1) divides the in-
put image into overlapping patches, (2) denoises each patch
(with D3-MP) using the constructed dictionaries (with D3-
DL), and (3) reconstructs the denoised image by averaging
the pixels in overlapping patches. In our experiments, we set
the amount of overlap to 75% of the patch size.
Randomization: In our experiments, we observe that
Algorithm 1 D3-MP
Input: A set of dictionaries {Si}κi=1, image patch p.
Output: processed patch q.
q ← 0
pˆ← p
for i = 1 to κ do
a← pˆ>Si
l← argmaxk|ak|
q ← q + alsl
pˆ← pˆ− alsl
return q
Algorithm 2 D3-DL
Input: saliency algorithmH, training images D, size of
dictionary η, sparsity κ, .
Output: set of dictionaries {Si}κi=1.
for i = 1 to κ do
n← 0
Si ← []
while n < η do
Randomly select x ∈ D.
Compute saliency mapH(x).
Randomly select patch s from x according toH(x).
if i = 1 then
s˜← D3-MP({S1}, s)
//Add s to S1 if it is arcsin() away.
if ‖s− s˜‖2/‖s‖2 >  then
Concatenate s/‖s‖2 to columns of Si
n← n+ 1
else
s˜← D3-MP({Sj}i−1j=1, s)
r ← s− s˜
//Add r to Si if it is arcsin() away.
r˜ ← D3-MP({Si}, r)
if ‖r − r˜‖2/‖r‖2 >  then
Concatenate r/‖r‖2 to columns of Si
n← n+ 1
without giving access to the patch dictionaries (i.e. the grey-
box setting), the D3 algorithm is successful in defending
against the adversarial attack. However, the defense is
weaker when the adversary has access to the dictionary. This
observation motivates us to add randomization to our trans-
formation function, T (.), when the adversary has full access
to the D3 algorithm (white-box setting). By adding random-
ization, even though the adversary can access the dictionary,
exact atoms used for reconstruction will not be available. We
add following efficient randomization schemes (both training
and test time) to our defense:
• We randomize over the columns of the dictionaries by
randomly selecting one fifth of the atoms in the patch
dictionaries while denoising a patch.
• We further randomize by first selecting the top-2 most
correlated atoms from the patch dictionary and ran-
domly picking one of those two.
5. Experiments
We conduct experiments on the 1000-class ImageNet
dataset [12] with a ResNet-50 [22]. We evaluate defense
against the following diverse set of attack algorithms –
FGSM [18] which is a one-step attack where gradient direc-
tion is multiplied by the norm of the noise, DeepFool [37]
that is an iterative attack ensuring that the network output
is changed, CWattack [9] that solves an optimization prob-
lem to find the adversarial perturbation, and UAP [36] as a
transferable attack that computes a universal noise for all the
images. We compute the adversarial perturbation in floating
point and scale it to have a fixed `2 norm, i.e.
‖v‖2
‖x‖2 = 0.06.
This noise is added to the image after it has been converted
to floating point and normalized. This experimental setup
is described in [20]. We compare the D3 algorithm with
several image transformation based defenses proposed in
[20] and show significant improvement in classification ac-
curacy. Furthermore, we analyze the tradeoff between the
clean image accuracy and the robustness against the attacks.
We study the effect of the hyper-parameter values and show
how they can be tuned to improve the accuracy or the robust-
ness. We use a pre-trained network on the original image
space x and fine-tune it on the transformed images T (x).
We set  = 0.85 for dictionary reconstruction and discuss
the effects of other hyper-parameters in Section 5.1.
Tradeoff between Accuracy and Robustness: Hyper-
parameters of the D3 algorithm can be used to control the
quality of image reconstruction. For example, as we increase
the sparsity, κ, more details are preserved and the accuracy
on the reconstructed clean images, T (x), is improved. How-
ever, if the image has been corrupted with adversarial noise,
increasing κ reconstructs more noise, and the accuracy on the
reconstructed noisy images, T (x+ v), eventually decreases.
We plot the accuracy on clean and noisy images with a
grey-box attack in Figure 4(a). As we can see from the plots,
the classification accuracy on the clean images consistently
improves with sparsity. The accuracy on the noisy images
is low with small sparsity and increases in the beginning
as the reconstruction quality improves. After increasing
the sparsity to a large value, the noise also starts getting
reconstructed, and the classification accuracy drops. Hence,
there is a “sweet spot” (for example, κ = 4 for DeepFool)
for optimal defense against the attack, and sparsity can be
used as a tradeoff parameter.
Figure 4(b) shows the matching-rate (MR) and the
reconstruction-quality (1 - RE) for the same sparsity val-
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sparsity
50
55
60
65
70
75
Ac
cu
ra
cy
 (%
)
Clean
FGSM
DeepFool
(a)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Sparsity
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
M
R
MR
1 - RE
0.75
0.80
0.85
0.90
0.95
1.00
1 
- R
E
(b)
Figure 4: (a) Tradeoff between the clean image accuracy and the robustness of the classifier with increasing sparsity. (b)
Matchine rate (MR) and reconstruction quality (1 - RE) for the same sparsity values. From these two figures, we can see
that clean image accuracy and the reconstruction quality increase with sparsity. The MR decreases with sparsity, causing the
classifier to be less robust. The classifier performance on adversarially perturbed images is low with small sparsity due to low
reconstruction quality, and is also low with large sparsity because of low matching-rate. The optimal performance is achieved
at an intermediate value (e.g. κ = 4 for DeepFool attack). Due to computational constraints, we reduce the patch overlap to 8
pixels for this analysis which improves the reconstruction speed by 4x.
ues. We see that the reconstruction quality improves with
sparsity, and is correlated with the classification accuracy on
the clean images. However, the matching-rate decreases as
sparsity is increased, causing the network to be less robust
to adversarial noise. In our experiments, we find that dic-
tionary size also plays a role in the accuracy and robustness
tradeoff. A larger dictionary improves the accuracy on the
clean images because the images are better reconstructed.
A smaller dictionary generally improves the robustness be-
cause the dictionary atoms are, on average, farther apart.
This correlation between the (MR, 1-RE) and the classifier’s
performance enables us to efficiently study the effects of
hyper-parameters.
Based on this analysis, we pick three settings to evaluate
our algorithm. In the first setting, we set high sparsity and
choose a large dictionary (κ = 5, dictionary size η = 40k).
This setting encourages high accuracy on the clean images,
but is less robust against adversarial attacks. In the second
setting, we reduce the dictionary size while keeping the
sparsity the same (κ = 5, dictionary size η = 10k). In the
third setting, we set the dictionary size η = 10k, and reduce
the sparsity to 4, further improving the robustness. Next,
we describe three types of attacks (black-box, grey-box, and
white-box) and compare our results with the state-of-the-art.
Black-box Attack: In this attack, the adversary does not
have access to the network parameters, or the defense mech-
anism. We use a separate ResNet-50 network and compute
the adversarial perturbations using original images, x. As
mentioned earlier, the `2-norm of the noise is set to 0.06
and it is added to the floating point image. As shown in
Table 1, all the methods are robust to these attacks as this
attack is the easiest to defend. Note that here we assume
that the adversary knows about the network architecture but
not the exact parameters. We also compare with the best
method [27] in the NIPS2017 challenge. This method used
a different base network (InceptionV3) which had a higher
clean image (no-attack) accuracy of 76.6%. We used their
pre-trained network/defense algorithm and evaluated it with
our experimental setup. Compared to D3, it had a signifi-
cantly lower accuracy under DeepFool attack (59.8%) and
slightly better accuracy (71.9%) under FGSM attack. Note
that better performance on FGSM attack may be due to their
defense being trained using adversarially perturbed images
with FGSM.
Grey-box Attack: In this setting, the adversary does not
have access to the defense mechanism but knows about the
network weights. We compute all the noise patterns using
gradients of the fine-tuned network evaluated at the original
images, x. This setting is the same as the “white-box” set-
ting in [20], so we compare our results in grey-box setting
to their white-box setting. Without any defense mechanism,
the attacks are very successful in this setting: FGSM reduces
the classification accuracy to 6.2%, DeepFool reduces it to
9.2%, and UAP reduces it to 20.8%. Our results in Table 2
show that we perform significantly better than the state-of-
the-art. We also note that as we decease the dictionary size
η or the sparsity κ, the robustness of the classifier improves.
For example, with η = 40k, κ = 5, the DeepFool accuracy
is 58.7% which improves to 64.4% by reducing η to 10k
and sparsity to 4. As before, we do not use any adversarial
Table 1: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) with black-box attacks (1000 ImageNet classes).
METHOD NO ATTACK DEEPFOOL CWATTACK FGSM UAP
D3 (η = 40k, κ = 5) 71.8 63.1 63.3 68.6 71.5
D3 (η = 10k, κ = 5) 70.8 64.6 64.8 68.3 70.3
D3 (η = 10k, κ = 4) 69.0 64.8 65.0 67.1 68.9
QUILTING [20] 70.1 65.2 64.1 65.5 -
TVM + QUILTING [20] 72.4 65.8 64.0 65.7 -
CROPPING + TVM + QUILTING [20] 72.1 67.1 65.3 66.7 -
Table 2: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) with grey-box attacks (1000 ImageNet classes).
NETWORKS NO ATTACK DEEPFOOL CWATTACK FGSM UAP
D3 (η = 40k, κ = 5) 71.8 58.7 57.9 67.3 71.5
D3 (η = 10k, κ = 5) 70.8 62.3 62.4 67.5 70.4
D3 (η = 10k, κ = 4) 69.0 64.4 64.5 67.1 68.7
QUILTING [20] 66.9 34.5 30.5 39.6 -
CROPPING [20] 65.4 44.9 41.1 49.5 -
TVM [20] 66.3 44.7 48.4 31.4 -
ENSEMBLE TRAINING [47, 20]1 80.3 1.8 22.2 69.2 -
Table 3: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) with white-box attacks (1000 ImageNet classes).
NETWORKS NO ATTACK DEEPFOOL CWATTACK FGSM
XIE ET AL. [50, 4]2 - - 0.0 -
QUILTING [20, 4]2 - - 0.0 -
D3 (η = 40k, κ = 5) 70.8 27.5 27.1 54.5
D3 (η = 10k, κ = 5) 69.8 31.0 30.9 55.8
D3 (η = 10k, κ = 4) 68.2 34.3 34.4 56.9
examples while fine-tuning the network. Ensemble train-
ing [47]1 does better on FGSM attack (69.2% accuracy) by
training the network with FGSM adversarial examples. But
the trained model performs poorly with DeepFool attack,
resulting only in 1.8% accuracy.
White-box Attack: Since the D3 transformation function
is not differentiable, we cannot fool the network using
gradient-based attacks (FGSM, DeepFool, CWAttack, or
UAP). We compute the adversarial noise, v, using the fine-
tuned network weights while the gradients are computed at
the transformed image, T (x). This noise, v, is added to the
image x. This attack is same as BDPA of [4]. Under this
challenging setting, the DeepFool attack reduces the classifi-
cation accuracy to 13.0%, and the FGSM attack reduces it
to 34.4%. We can make D3 more robust by adding random-
ization, which prevents the attacker from accessing the exact
atoms used for reconstruction, as described in Section 4.3.
Classification accuracies using D3 with randomization are
1The results of the ensemble training algorithm are taken from [20].
shown in Table 3 which shows significant improvement over
the deterministic version. As with the other attack types, the
algorithm is more robust with a smaller dictionary and lower
sparsity. We achieve accuracy of 13% without randomiza-
tion and 34.4% with randomization on the BPDA compared
to the 0% accuracy reported in [4]. We hypothesize that
this improvement is partially due to the fact that our transfor-
mation radically reduces the effective dimensionality of the
input images. We are able to use a bigger patch size 16× 16
(even upto 32×32) which effectively limits the search space
for an adversary.
5.1. Hyper-parameters selection
The proposed D3 defense has the following hyper-
parameters: patch-size, P , sparsity, κ, dictionary size, η,
and minimum distance between two dictionary atoms, .
They affect the overall performance in different ways. For
example, as we increase the patch size, the robustness of
the classifier improves while it becomes less accurate. In-
2The results of the BPDA attack are taken from [4].
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Figure 5: Effect of patch size (P ) on matching-rate and
reconstruction-quality (1 - RE). Increasing P improves the
matching-rate (robustness) but reduces the reconstruction-
quality.
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Figure 6: Matching-rate improves as  increases or correla-
tion among dictionary atoms decreases. The reconstruction-
quality (1− RE) decreases with increasing .
creasing the minimum angle between two atoms, i.e. , also
improves the robustness but degrades the classifier accu-
racy. However, we recommend keeping  high because it
improves the robustness more than it hurts accuracy on the
clean images.
We analyze the effect of κ on accuracy in Figure 4,
and show how the accuracy and the robustness are corre-
lated with the matching-rate (MR) and the reconstruction-
quality (1 - RE). We show the effect of different patch
sizes (P = 8, 16, 24, 32) in Figure 5 on matching-rate and
reconstruction-quality. As we increase the patch size, the
matching-rate increases that is the robustness of the classi-
fier improves. However, the reconstruction-quality (1− RE)
decreases making the classifier less accurate.
Next, we study the effect of  in Figure 6. As expected,
increasing the minimum angle between two atoms, increases
the matching-rate and will improve the robustness. We also
find that the reconstruction-quality (1− RE) decreases, thus
decreasing the classifier accuracy. Figure 7 shows example
images with different sparsity values.
(a) κ = 1 (b) κ = 3
(c) κ = 5 (d) Original Image
Figure 7: Denoised images with varying sparsity.
Effect of Task-Complexity: For simpler tasks, the D3 al-
gorithm can reduce more information from the images while
maintaining the classification accuracy and the robustness to
attack. To evaluate our defense mechanism on a lower com-
plexity task, we train a classifier on 50 randomly selected
ImageNet classes. Under black-box attack, in the worst case
the performance reduces from 93.2% to 91.8% and under
grey-box attack it reduces to 89.7%. In the white-box set-
ting, the top-1 classification accuracy on adversarial images
drops to 70.9% from 91.7% (on clean images). We also
evaluated our algorithm on CIFAR-10 dataset, another lower
complexity task, and compared with many state-of-the-art
methods given in [45] under FGSM attack. Our algorithm
achieved 87% clean accuracy and 80% accuracy under the
attack. Our attack-agnostic defense is better than all the
defense methods but the one that specialized specifically for
FGSM attack by adding adversarial images to the training.
The complete evaluation on small ImageNet and CIFAR-10
datasets are included in Appendices A and B, respectively.
6. Conclusion
We described a novel patch-based denoising algorithm to
improve the robustness of classifiers, trained on large-scale
datasets, against adversarial perturbations. We developed
two proxy metrics (MR and RE) to help guide us in design-
ing the algorithm. The design of our denoising (D3-MP),
and patch selection (D3-DL) algorithms encourages high
matching-rate between the clean patch and the correspond-
ing noisy patch. We provided a thorough study of the tradeoff
between clean image accuracy and robustness against the
attacks. We proposed an efficient randomization schemes to
improve the robustness against white-box attacks. Our eval-
uation on the ImageNet show that our defense mechanism
provides state-of-the-art results.
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Appendix A: Experiments on 50-class ImageNet
For simpler tasks, the D3 algorithm can reduce more informa-
tion from the images while maintaining the classification accuracy
and the robustness to attack. To evaluate our defense mechanism
on a lower complexity task, we train a classifier on 50 randomly
selected ImageNet classes. We find that the proposed defense (D3)
is successful on this lower complexity task.
As shown in Tables 4 and 5, black and grey-box attacks lower
the top-1 classification accuracy by less than 4%. In the most
challenging white-box setting including the DeepFool attack, the
top-1 classification accuracy drops to 70.9% from 91.7% on clean
images. This 20.8% drop compares favorably with the 35.3% loss
in accuracy for the 1000-class classifier under the same setting.
Table 4: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) on black-box
attacks (50 ImageNet classes)
NETWORKS NO ATTACK DEEPFOOL FGSM
D3 (η = 40K,κ = 5) 94.0% 92.1 93.3
D3 (η = 10K,κ = 5) 93.9 91.8 93.1
D3 (η = 10K,κ = 4) 93.2 91.8 92.2
Table 5: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) on grey-box at-
tacks (50 ImageNet classes)
NETWORKS NO ATTACK DEEPFOOL FGSM
D3 (η = 40K,κ = 5) 94.0 86.0 91.8
D3 (η = 10K,κ = 5) 93.9 88.0 91.8
D3 (η = 10K,κ = 4) 93.2 89.7 91.7
Table 6: Top-1 classification accuracy (%) on white-box
attacks (50 ImageNet classes)
NETWORKS NO ATTACK DEEPFOOL FGSM
D3 (η = 40K,κ = 5) 93.3 66.2 85.4
D3 (η = 10K,κ = 5) 92.8 66.4 85.4
D3 (η = 10K,κ = 4) 91.7 70.9 85.8
Appendix B: Experiments on CIFAR-10 dataset
Table 7 compares the D3 algorithm withe several recent de-
fense algorithms under FGSM attack. Evaluation of the defense
algorithms is taken from PixelDefend [45](PD) paper. The D3
performs better than all the methods except Adversarial FGSM
which is specifically trained using FGSM perturbed images, while
our method is attack-agnostic.
Table 7: Classification accuracy (%) CIFAR-10 dataset.
NETWORK TRAINING/DEFENSE NO ATTACK FGSM
RESNET NORMAL 92 11
VGG NORMAL 89 30
RESNET ADVERSARIAL FGSM 91 91
RESNET ADVERSARIAL BIM 87 34
RESNET LABEL SMOOTHING 92 28
RESNET FEATURE SQUEEZING 84 18
RESNET ADVERSARIAL FGSM 86 55
+ FEATURE SQUEEZING
RESNET NORMAL 85 24
+ PIXELDEFEND
VGG NORMAL + PIXELDEFEND 82 52
RESNET ADVERSARIAL FGSM 88 67
+ PIXELDEFEND
RESNET ADVERSARIAL FGSM 90 67
+ ADAPTIVE PIXELDEFEND
RESNET D3 87 80
